In his analysis titled “What Does the French Foreign Aid to Ukraine Convey to Europe?”, Ben Jennana Marwene delves into France’s support for Ukraine not only through figures but also by interpreting it within the framework of rationalist internationalism and Europe’s geopolitical imperatives. The article highlights the gap between rhetoric and reality in French foreign policy under President Macron, assessing the country’s selective engagement strategy through the lens of economic nationalism and historical parallels. Shedding light on the strategic calculations behind France’s limited contributions, this piece is a valuable resource for those questioning France’s role in Europe’s support for Ukraine.
Analysis
The origins of the ongoing war along the eastern border of Europe are best understood when traced back to the Revolution of Dignity, which 2014 took place at a culminating point of the Euromaidan Revolution. It was sparked in 2013 by President Viktor Yanukovych’s unexpected decision to abstain from signing the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement, opting instead for closer ties with the Russian Federation and the Eurasian Economic Union. It is noted that President Yanukovych had served as the fourth president of Ukraine from 2010 to 2014, profusely emphasised his commitment to closer ties with Russia following the country’s independence on August 24, 1991, after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It is important to address Euro-Russian relations not only from a historical perspective but also through legal and strategic lenses. In this context, it should be noted that the Russian Federation is considered the only subject of public international law with full sovereignty, acting as the successor to the USSR. As a result, Ukraine, along with the 15 former satellite states, holds utmost strategic and vital importance to the central administration in Moscow. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was formalised by the Belavezha Accords (officially called the agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and unofficially known as the Minsk Agreement) signed on December 8, 1991, by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The agreement effectively declared that the USSR would cease to exist and that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would be established in its place. The dissolution was later ratified by the Alma-Ata Protocol on December 21, 1991, which was signed by representatives of 11 former Soviet republics, formally marking the end of the Soviet Union. The conflict in Ukraine has continued to escalate since it reached a critical turning point in February 2022 when it shifted into a high-stakes geopolitical confrontation between the Russian authorities and the Ukrainian army. This shift raises questions about the validity of the traditional narrative regarding European support, particularly concerning whether decisive countries like France are genuinely committed to the Ukrainian side or simply aiming to preserve their influence on the global stage by rethinking the Russo-EU relations.
France’s Role in the EU’s Support for Ukraine: A Macronist Perspective (2021-2025)
President Macron’s diplomatic engagements (with whom) highlighted in his speech in the European parliament on the 8th of November 2024 the occasion of the results of the presidential elections 2024 that “a shift in focus toward the adequacy of European support to the European people and for the European people rather than focusing on misleading missions” is deemed urgently necessary to resuscitate the balance of power in Europe, particularly from key players like France. In this context, Polish Prime Minister “Donald Tusk” and French President Emmanuel Macron held talks in Warsaw on December 12th, 2024, at the behest of discussing the support for Ukraine ahead of the incoming Donald Trump-led administration in the United States in January 2025 as
per the communiqué of the Elysée. Despite the strong rhetoric, the data paints a more complex picture in actuality. According to the statistics conducted by the Kiel Institute based on the 2023 research paper titled “The Ukraine Support Tracker”, for instance, the governmental support to Ukraine (Total bilateral allocations) is found to not exceed 5 billion € which ranked the European giant in the fourth position among the total of 41 studied countries’ contributions. It falls behind major powers like Germany and the United Kingdom, which suggests a gap between France’s public commitments and its actual financial support. This is to mention that a share in EU aid (including MFA, EIB) allocated by France reaches up to 8.58 billion € from the study period from January 24, 2022, to October 31, 2024. The following graphic representation is deemed to represent the actual French Contribution to the Ukrainian cause.
Source: The author’s own elaboration, based on the data provided by the Kiel Institute.
During the same period, and when inspected through a broader lens encompassing military, humanitarian, and financial aid, the institute’s findings reveal a more comprehensive perspective on Ukraine’s support efforts. In this regard, Paris falls short also from catching a top-notch ranking. It is in 10th position with almost insignificant
0.60 billion € for Humanitarian aid, 3.48 billion € for military aid as well as a modest total allocation number of 0.80 billion € for financial aid. To maintain accuracy, a pie chart was deemed unnecessary, as France’s contribution rates are notably lower than those depicted in the previous chart. Consequently, despite ranking 10th overall, France’s support remains relatively modest and can be considered insignificant in comparison to other key contributors among the 27 member states of the EU.
Micronistic challenges: Budgetary Constraints & Economic Priorities in a Neo-Protectionist Context
From the year 1958, the fifth republic external policy can be to a limited extent be described as stable and consistent in reference to France’s role within the European Union. The skeptic Gaulist endeavour of the country has been gradually fading away throughout the 8 successive administrations after the crisis of 1968 that put an end to the isolationist temperament of general Charles de Gaulle (1959–1969). Beginning with
Georges Pompidou (1969–1974), Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981), François Mitterrand (1981–1995), Jacques Chirac (1995–2007), Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012), François Hollande (2012–2017) and Emmanuel Macron in two terms (2017–present), the politics of the Elysée were advancing towards a liberal economic modal in the EU countries in accordance with the dictates of the Copenhagen Criteria. Besides, the elections of President Donald Trump for his second term in November 2024, thus, the financial and military aid to Ukraine can be contextualized within a broader global shift toward economic nationalism and protectionist policies reminiscent of the 19th century. Just as 19th-century European states prioritized domestic economic fortification in response to industrialization and shifting global trade patterns, France today faces similar imperatives amid post-pandemic bundle of economic recovery measures and inflationary pressures. During the 19th century, protectionist policies such as the Corn Laws in Britain (1815-1846) and Napoleon III’s tariffs in France were implemented to shield domestic industries and workers from external economic shocks. Meanwhile, President Macron’s administration similarly prioritizes economic sovereignty, seeking to protect French industries from global disruptions, particularly in sectors like energy and defense. This regressive behaviour explains the reason driving France’s selective engagement strategy regarding Ukraine, focusing on high-value military aid (e.g., CAESAR howitzers) rather than large-scale financial commitments that could strain domestic budgets.
Conclusion
While France is traditionally seen as a leading power in international society and a key player in European foreign policy, the figures indicate that its response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine reveals a gap between rhetoric and action. It is evident that President Macron’s administration firmly opposes Moscow’s expansionist ambitions. However, when comparing France’s approach to those of other European nations, it becomes clear that France’s sovereign decisions have taken a more nuanced and differentiated stance on Ukraine. Nevertheless, the analysis of the data suggests that France’s financial contributions remain limited compared to other major European powers, which raises questions concerning public commitments to supporting Kyiv, which makes the French position somewhat blurry insofar. In a political reading, it is notable that Emmanuel Macron’s cautious approach reflects a return to economic pragmatism (a hallmark of 19th-century statecraft that aligns with Friedrich List’s school of thought), that tramples the idea that the national economic interests dictate the extent of international engagement. In this light, France’s limited financial aid to Ukraine is not merely an oversight but a strategic recalibration in an era of resurging economic nationalism. This tension mirrors how states historically engaged in selective internationalism in modern Europe.
Photo: Macron is due to host a summit on Thursday alongside Zelensky © Ludovic MARIN / AFP
