The sequence of events that began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and continues to this day reveals that the geopolitical tensions between Russia and the West are not merely a historical legacy, but also one of the most pressing issues in contemporary international relations.
Analysis
Dimensions and Repercussions of the Russian-Western Rivalry on the Nexus of “Energy-for-Security”
The origins of the contemporary Ukrainian issue date back to 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Ukraine’s independence in the same year. In 1994, the Budapest Memorandum was signed, under which the Russian Federation pledged to respect Ukraine’s borders in exchange for Kyiv relinquishing its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in favour of Russia. Geopolitical calculations soon imposed themselves on Eastern Europe, and most of the republics independent of the Soviet Union (by the number of 15) shifted to the Western camp, either by joining NATO (constituting about half of the member states of the alliance, which was founded in 1949) or joining the European Union. The year 2004 constructed a landmark moment in the history of the EU with ten countries joining at once, most of them from the Eastern Bloc. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999 while nine Eastern European countries, some of them former Soviet republics (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and Albania) joined NATO between 2004 and 2009. Only Belarus and Ukraine remain as buffer states between Russia and NATO. For Russia, joining NATO would mean being trapped within its own borders. The accession of President Vladimir Putin to power in 1999 has been of pivotal aftermath on the security in Eastern Europe as it concluded technically with the pacifist policies of Mikhail Gorbachev’s перестройка (perestroika) and гласность (glasnost) just to initiate a more confrontational foreign policy better known under путинская система which established its legitimacy through its ability to impose order internally and attempt to restore external respect for Russia and restore its role as a major world power. Following the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections in Russia, President Putin sought to impose his full control over all the political, economic, military and security capabilities of the ex-Soviet state and tended to preserve what he called the borders of the “Russian Federation”, even through means of high politics if necessary. During his tenure, “colour revolutions” started to take place in several former Soviet republics (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan), followed by elections that produced a new political and intellectual elite closer to Western liberal thought, which Putin considered an “American plot” to penetrate Russian spheres of influence and dealt with as a serious threat not only to the Russian state strategically but equally to him personally and his regime. Therefore, President Putin began fomenting internal unrest in Ukraine in 2004, went to war against Georgia in 2008, and supported the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from its territory. Moscow’s fears escalated with the outcomes of the NATO summit held in the Romanian capital, Bucharest, in 2008, during which the alliance completed its “6th round of enlargement … welcomed Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership and agreed that these countries will become members of NATO” by making use of the framework of the NATO-Ukraine Commission
(which has since become the NATO-Ukraine Council) according to the inaugural speech of his excellency Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, former NATO’s secretary general. The Bucharest Summit was, thus, regarded by the Kremlin as a declaration of a prolonged war opposing Russia with the West (spearheaded by the United States of America. Starting with the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, followed by the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 and Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula, President Putin initiated a series of precautionary military confrontations to prevent these two republics from joining NATO. To better capitalise on the essential milestones tracing the evolution of the Russian-Western relation, it is essential to highlight the US’ stakes. The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, signed on May 27, 1997, is a key document to understanding the post-soviet complex international relations. It established a framework for cooperation between NATO and Russia after the Cold War and, most importantly, enshrined the alliance’s doctrine vis-à-vis the enlargement policy which according to Vladimir Putin’s perspective puts Moscow’s strategic existence under direct security threat. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) clearly states that “NATO’s door remains open to any European country in a position to undertake the commitments and obligations of membership, and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area”. In compliance with NATO’s “open door policy” of 1949, these policies enable the enlargement of the Alliance to an ongoing and dynamic process of accession. Memberships have thrived from the 12 founding members to today’s 32 members through 10 rounds of enlargement in 1952, 1955, 1982, 1999,2004, 2009, 2017, 2020, 2023 and 2024 according to official sources.
In the “security document” President Putin demanded the signing of two separate agreements between Moscow, Washington and NATO to establish a system of security guarantees in order to reduce security tensions in Europe, NATO’s abandonment of any military activity in Georgia and Ukraine, their non-accession to NATO, and stopping the deployment of offensive weapons systems in countries neighbouring Russia, but Washington refused. The decision to resort to military action was made because, according to his military doctrine, it represents the “perfect moment” to pressure NATO and the European Union to restructure the European security structure, commensurate with Russia’s position now, which is different from what it was in 1991. Some estimates indicate that from 2014 to 2021, Ukraine will receive about $5.6 billion from the United States, including weapons and training equipment for the army, support to combat cyber threats, as well as intelligence support to counter Russian threats through the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative. NATO also approved a comprehensive aid package to strengthen Ukraine’s defence and security strategy. On 20 February 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin recognised the independence of two republics that broke away from Ukraine, namely “Lugansk” and “Donetsk”. On the 24th of the same month, Russian armed forces carried out a full-scale military invasion of Ukrainian territory under the pretext that this came at the invitation of these two separatist republics to the Russian regime to defend them against what the Russian regime called: “the war of extermination waged by the neo-Nazis in Ukraine” against the ethnic Russian minorities
in the two republics. Therefore, important strategic shifts popped up to the surface that were largely linked to Putin’s military doctrine and specifically in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 as military and security cooperation between the United States and Ukraine went through an unprecedented upsurge as per the indications of the US governmental sources.
Towards a New Security Architecture in Europe and Beyond
Essentially driven by the devastating repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic 2019, the European Union rediscovered the ‘Jean Monnetian’ art of transforming a crisis into an opportunity for solidifying integration a step ahead. It coupled post-pandemic economic recovery with a repowered European green agenda. The normal rhythm of the recovery process was unexpectedly obliterated by Russia’s claimed military operations on the European borders, mainly shared Ukrainian-Russian territorial borders. This step has moved security and defence back to a more central position in European politics. As a matter of fact, Luis Simón, a Senior Analyst and Director of the Elcano Royal Institute’s Brussels Office, acknowledges that “the return of interstate war in Europe has also led to an increased focus on deterrence and territorial defence and a revival of NATO”. This geopolitical projection was supported in a public opinion poll performed by The Directorate-General for Communication of the European Union in which 87% of EU citizens favour the establishment of a common European defence policy as a solid step to deter any past Ukraine territorial aggression. The same poll indicates that “for 28% of EU citizens, the war is one of the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment”. Nevertheless, Brussels’ apprehension to the Kremlin has risen since March 2014 and gradually restricted the Euro-Russian relations. Indeed, the measures were first introduced in March 2014 but were most recently extended until 15 March 2025. The EU has progressively imposed restrictive measures on Russia in response to the following causes:
- The illegal annexation of Crimea (2014)
- The full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022)
- The illegal annexation of Donetsk (Донецьк), Luhansk (Луганськ), Zaporizhzhia (Запоріжжя) and Kherson (Херсон) regions of Ukraine (2022)
As a matter of fact, the EU has not considered any serious leverage towards Russian aggression since 2022. Its defensive policy maintained a liberal approach that counterpoises the Russian offensive doctrine and has only imposed 13 packages of financial sanctions intended to reduce Russia’s ability to finance the war. In conclusion, while the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been pivotal in crisis management as a supranational institution (internally) and the biggest Political and Economic Union in the world, it falls short of addressing the broader strategic challenges posed by rising geopolitical tensions, best exemplified by the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2021. The distinguished nuclear arsenal paired with the
neo-eurasianist doctrine of the Russian military obliges the EU to rethink its Common Security and Defence Policy at moments of high intensity to urgently call for marginalising the “low-intensity” crisis management operations outside of Europe. It is still defined as “an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.” Therefore, the urgent need to tame it to englobe the international threat more offensively is recommended. The CSDP, in its current form, remains largely a reactive mechanism lacking the comprehensive capabilities needed for long-term deterrence and territorial defence. This shift requires a deeper alignment with NATO, building on the foundation laid by key milestones such as the 1999 Cologne European Council as well as the 2003 Berlin Plus agreement.
Ben Jennana Marwene
References
- https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraine-war-and-future-european-unions-securit y-and-defense-policy
- https://securityconference.org/en/munich-security-report-2024/munich-securi ty-index-2024/
- https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11897
- https://edam.org.tr/en/blog/russia-proposes-a-new-security-architecture-in-eu rope-and-beyond
- https://www.brussels-school.be/sites/default/files/CSDS%20Policy%20brief_2 212.pdf
- https://www.socialeurope.eu/how-the-war-in-ukraine-has-transformed-the-eu
- https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-meaning-of-sovereignty-ukrainian-and-europea n-views-of-russias-war-on-ukraine/
- https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm
